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Despite the vast growth in the theoretical literature on the importance of credibility and reputation effects in the conduct of monetary and fiscal licy, there is little empirical evidence on these issues available to date. In Weber (1988c~the empirical relevance of the game-theoretical models of Backus 8z Driffill [(1985a), (1985b)1 is evaluated and the estimated counterinflation reputation measures are found to be fairly consistent with a large number of purely descriptive papers on this issue. The present paper extents this work to a second class of important game-theoretical credibility models; it aims at empirically estimating the credibility measures of Cukierman 8z Meltzer [(1983), (1986a), (1986b), (1986c)], which are derived from the public's expectations about the future course of monetary poticy. These rational expectations critically depend on two specific aspects of the model: firstly, the policymaker's preferences for low money growth and economic
stimulus through surprise money growth are supposed to change gradually over time and monetazy control is assumed imperfect, as reflected by transitory control errors. As a result, the public becomes awaze of changes in policy objectives only gradually by observing past monetary growth. Secondly, the policymakers are required to make announcements about planned money growth, but are not forced to issue precise
announcements or to stick to the announced policies. As a result, these (possibly biased) monetary announcements represent no more than a piece of contemporazy information, which the public may or may not use in its expectation formation process. Optimal
expectations under incomplete contemporary information typically result as a weighted average of the expectation of money growth conditional on past information and
additionally on the current money growth announcement. Under perfectly credible announcements, the weight attached to these announcements will be equal to one, and under non~redible announcements will tend towards zero. The paper presents empirical
estimates of this credibility measure for the EMS-member countries Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands as well as for the United States, Japan, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, Canada and Australia.
1.Introduction
In late 1974, the German Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce a
formal monetary tazget in terms of the growth of a monetazy aggregate for a period
as long as a year. This example was followed by the Federal Reserve of the United
States in eazly 1975, where the initiative for the move to monetary growth
announcements came from the legislature rather than from the central bank. Also in
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1975, the Swiss and Canadian central banks announced formal monetary targets and
in 1976 the monetary authorities of the United Kingdom and France followed suit.
In addition to theee aix countries with formally announced monetary aggregate
tazgets, which constitute the focus of the paper, a number of borderline cases will
also be considered: the Italian central bank chose a total domestic credit aggregate
rather than a monetary aggregate as a formal intermediate target for monetary policy
after 1974 but awitched to monetazy quantity tazgeta in 1986. The Australian central
bank since 1976 has announced 'guidelines' for monetary aggregates and, aince 1978,
the Bank of Japan has made 'projections' for a monetary aggregate. Finally, the
Dutch Central Bank after early 1977 focused on a national liquidity ratio, defined in
terms of a monetary aggregate relative to national income.
In the present study all the cases in the sec~nd group will be considered and are
treated identically to thoae in the first group in order to facilitate an international
comparison. This procedure, of course, can be criticized on various grounds: with
respect to the Netherlands it is uncleaz whether the monetary suthority actively seeks
to control the monetary aggregate or national income to achieve the desired liquidity
ratio in the long run. In the cases of Japan and Australia it is uncertain whether or
not the actual monetary policy is subsequently adjusted to try and validate the
'projections' or 'guidelinea' for the monetary aggregates.
A further drawback of this direct international comparison ia given by the fact
that the different countriea under study focus on different monetary aggregates with
different degrees of potential controllability from the monetary authority. Among the
countries announcing target growth rates for narrowly controllable monetary
aggregates, the Swiss National Bank focuses on a monetary base tazget, over which it
has almost perfect control. Wider and leas directly controllable monetary aggregates
were targeted by both Canada and the United States, who announced growth targets
for M1, while France, the Netherlands and again the United States announced growth
targeta for M2. Broadly defined monetary aggregates were targeted by Japan (M2
plus certificates of deposits), the United Kingdom (Sterling M3), Australia (M3) and-3-
again the United States (M2,M3). An intermediate case is the German central bank
money (CBM) target, which comprisses reserve requirements on the components of
M3 and hence is broadly defined but more directly controllable than the cases above.
Finally, Italy targeted ceilings for total domestic credit (TDC), which ís not a
monetary but a credit aggregate.
A final complication for an empirical evaluation and compazison of monetazy
quantity target announcements since the mid seventies is given by the frequent shifts
between different targeted monetary aggregates and by the transitory (or permanent)
abolition of formal money growth target announcements.
Minor changes in the definition of the targeted monetary aggregate were
observable in France (M2, M2R) and the United Kingdom (Sterling M3, M3). These
minor changes were accounted for in this study by trying to use announcements for
one monetary aggregate consistently throughout the sample where possible.2
Major shifts between different monetary aggregates took place in Switzerland,
Germany, Italy and again in France and in the United Kingdom. The Swiss central
bank focused on M1 tazgets at the beginning of its target announcements between
1975 and 1978, abolished target announcements altogether in 1979 and announced
targets for the monetazy base (MB) for 1980 and for the adjusted monetary base
(MBA) between 1981 and 1988, as well as M3 after 1987. The French central bank
announced targets for M2 from 1977 until 1982, for M2R in 1984 and 1985, for M3
in 1986 and for M2 again after January 1987. The German Bundesbank switched
from announcing targets for the central bank money stock (CBM) between 1975 and
1987 to announcing targets for M3 for 1988 and 1989. The monetazy authority of the
United Kingdom announced targets for M3 from April 1976 until Mazch 1987 and for
MO from April 1987 onwazds. The Italian central bank switched from announcing
ZNote that the effects of such minor shifts in the definition of broader monetary aggregates
are stronger when levels rather than average annual growth rates, like in the present study,
are analysed. For the United Kingdom tazget growth rates for M3 were used throughout,
while for France no adjustment was made. Hence, some reservations with respect to the
estimates for France between 1984 and 1986 are in order.-4-
targeta for total domestic credit (TDC) ceilings between 1974 and 1987 to also
announcing targets growth rates for M2 after 1984. As a result of the more recent
disoontinuities in Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States and Italy, the
present paper only analyses the effecta of announcements before end of 1987.3
Furthermore, in the ca9e of the earlier discontinuities in Switzerland, only the
credibility of the Swiss adjusted monetazy base tazget (MBA) announcements between
January 1981 and December 1987 is analysed, while the earlier tazgets for M1
between 1975 and 1978 are looked at only briefly.
Finally, the abolition of official monetary target announcements was decided upon
by the central banks of Canada, the Netherlands and Australia. In Australia, the
government abandoned the conditional projections or 'guidelines' for M3 growth after
January 1985, and policy setting is now made on the basis of the so-called 'check
list', which considers a range of financial and economic indicators. Due to this, the
credibility of Australian monetary announcementa is only analysed before January
1985. In the case of the Netherlands, the onset of the European Monetary System
(EMS) with its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in March 1979 led to a policy
stance wheae exchange rate considerations, especially with respect to the German
Mark were given priority over independent policy objectives. As a result, official
announcements of M2 tazgets were not made after December 1981. Increasing
orientation of monetary policy towazds an exchange rate target was also the reason
behind the abolition of M1 target announcements in Canada in November 1982.
Nevertheless, the present paper considers an unofficial (constant) monetary quantity
target for the Netherlands from January 1982 and for Canada from December 1982 to
December 1987.4 However, it is not being suggested that this is an adequate method
3For Germany, France, the Netherlands, Japan, the United States, Canada the sample
períod ends in December 1987, for the United Kingdom in Mazch 1987 and for Italy in
November 1987.
4Data on this implicit M1 target for Canada and the implicit M2 target for The
Netherlands are taken from "International Economic Conditions", Federal Reserve Bank of
5t. Louis, different volumes after August 31, 1982.-5-
of dealing with this problem and all results must be viewed accordingly.
After having highlighted some of the problems of the attempted comparative
study on the credibility of monetary announcements, I now turn to description of the
theoretical model and empirical results. The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: firstly, the theoretical model of Cukierman 8c Meltzer (1986a) is briefly
reviewed in section 2 and their theoretical credibility measures aze discuased in
section 3. The econometric approach to deriving some estimates of these credibility
measures is described in section 4 and the estimates aze presented in aection 5. A
discussion of the policy implications of the estimates conclude the paper.
2. The Model
In the theoretical model of Cukierman 8e Meltzer (1986a) monetazy policy
making is modelled as a repeated game with asymmetric information between the
central bank and the public. Both players aim at optimizing their respective objective
functions given their rational expectations of the other player's current move9
conditional on their current information sets. The public's moves conaist of forming
rational money growth expectations while the central bank's moves consist of setting
the actual and announced money growth rates to reflect their changing emphasis on
policy objectives such as high employment or economic stimulus through surprise
inflation and low inflation.
Each period the policymaker plans to achieve a particulaz rate of money growth
mP, which may differ from the actual rate of money growth mt because control is
imperfect:
mt - mp f B et , EEt~~t-1- ~' E(ftEt)I~t-1- a~ (1)
where Et is period t's normally independently diatributed serially uncorrelated
stochastic variable with zero mean and constant finite vaziance oÉ. The fixed system
coefficient B is assumed to be known by the public and will be determined below.-6-
Note that the variance BZOÉ reflects the extent to which the operating procedures
and the institutional environment prevent perfect control of money growth.
In addition to the above choice of the planned money growth rate mp the
policymaker is assumed to make announcements of future money growth targets but
is not required to make completely accurate announcementa. It is assumed that at
the beginning of each period the policymaker makes a noisy announcement mt:
mt-mt~Bnt Ent ~ ~t-1- ~' E(ntnt)~Ht-1- ~n (2)
where nt is a normally independently distributed serially uncorrelated stochastic
variable with zero mean and constant finite vaziance o~ The variance Bza~ reflects
the extent to which the policymaker allows the announced target band to range
azound a point target mt for money growth.
The policymaker's objectives in Cukierman 8e Meltzer (1986a) are described by a
multi-period state dependent policy preference function, the present value of which is
maximized by the choice of the above actual and announced rate of money growth.
Hence, as in Barro 8c Gordon [(1983a), (1983b)], Backus 8c Driffill [(1985a), (1985b)]
and Barro (1986) monetazy policy is viewed as a repeated game, where the
policymaker's objective function Zg is given by:
Zg(mt'mP'mt'mt) - t~ p L~t~J t
Ug(mt,mp,mt,m~) , (3)
with r as the government's subjective discount factor. The policymaker's policy
preference function Ug thereby involves two conflicting policy objectives. Firstly,
policymakers like high output (or economic stimulus) and dislike high inflation (or
money growth). The first argument is usually derived from a Phillips curve with
natural rate properties, where deviations of actual output qt from its natural rate qn-7-
are the result of money growth miaperceptions on the side of the public:
9t - 9n f( mt - mt ), (4)
with mt and mr as actual and expected money growth. Hence the policymaker's
one-period objective (payoff) function can be formalized by:
Ug(mt,mP,mi,mt) - - ~ (mP)2 f xt ( 4t - Qn )
- - ~ (mp)2 f xt ( rc~ - mt ) ,
(5)
where the relative weight xt attached to economic atimulation through aurprise money
growth is time-vazying and described by:
xt - A t pt , g1p, (ga)
Pt - pt-1 t at f vt , Evt ~ Ht-1-~' E(vtvr) ~~t-1-ov , (6b)
at - at-1 } wt ' Ewt ~~t-1-0' E(wtwr) ~~t-1-aw ' (6c)
Equations (6a) to (6c) specify the stochastic behaviour of the ahift pazameter xt and
indicate that the policymaker's objectives exhibit only a limited degree of persistence.
The policymaker's relative costs weight xt here is the sum of a systematic part A
and a stochastic part pt, which followa a non-stationary first order autoregresaive or
random walk process with a stochastic drift at, which itself followa a random walk.
Note that the model here deviates alightly from Cukierman 8c Meltzer (1986), who
explicitly asaume a stationary autoregresaive procesa pt-~t-1}wt with Ocpcl, but
that for p-1 and st-i-0 for all i-0,1,...,N both modela coincide. For the rest of the
theoretical exposition p-1 and st-i-0 for all i-0,1,...,N is assumed.
The public's preference function Up in Cukierman 8z Meltzer (1986a) can be- 8 -
formalized as:
Up(mt,mt,mt) - - ( rr~ - mt )2, (7)
the expected value of which the public minimizes wíth respect to the expected rate
of money growth mt. Expectations are assumed to be of the least-squared error type
and formed rationally, conditional on all publicly available information ftt at the
beginning of each period:
mt - Emt ~52t ,
with E as the mathematical expectations operator conditioned (~~ I ~~)
(8)
on the
information set 52t. The public's incomplete contemporary information set
S2t-12t(m~,ml,...mt-1, rr~,mi,...,mt-l,mt) includes all past actual and announced
money growth rates up to period t-1 and the new money growth announcement mt
issued by the policymaker at the beginning of the current period.
2.1. The Derivation of tbe Public's Rational Expectationa.
The solution to the above policy game depends critically on the information
advantage of the policymaker, who at the beginning of the current period knows
exactly the state in which his preference function lies. The best the public can do is
to infer the unknown state of the policymaker's preferences by forming rational
expectations conditional on the observations of past actual and current and past
announced money growth rates. In the following descríption these rational expectation
are focused upon, since the credibility measures estimated in the empirical section of
the paper are derived from them. For the derivation of the public's rational
expectations, the proof of their rationality and for the derivation of the government's
optimal decision rule the exposition in Cukierman 8s Meltzer (1986a) is referred to.
Under the method of undetermined ccefficients the reduced form solution for the- 9 -
government's deciaion rule derived from maximizing the policy preference function (3)
can be postulated as:
mP - BO A f B pt , (9)
where BO and B are conatants to be determined by the requirement of rational
expectations.
Using equations (1) and (2) the public's information variables mt and mL can be
expressed in terms of the policymaker's instrument variable mp as:
mt - mP f B et - BO A t B(ptfet) , (l0a)
mt - mp f B rlt - BO A -~ B(PtfOt) , (lOb)
where Emt
~~t-1-Emt ~~t-1-Emt ~~t-1-BOAfBEpt ~ ftt-1 holds due to the
distributional assumptions above. Furthermore, observing mi-mt-bt, the
announcement bias, amounts to observing:
a
bt - mt-mt - B (ntiEt) .
which has mean zero (Ebt~~t-1-0) and constant finite variance B2(o~foÉ) given the
distributional assumptions above.
Since under rational expectations the constants BOA and B are known to the
public, the current observation of mt amounts to observing the 'news' term
pt-Fnt-zt,
while observing mt reveals the 'news' term ptfEt-yt. Cukierman 8e
Meltzer ( 1986a) show that the optimal predictor of the unobservable planned current
money growth conditional on the information set f2ti ia given by:
EmP ~ ftt - BO A f B Ept ~(zt'zt-1'zt-2'...,Yt-1'yt-2'...) , (12)-lo-
where the information set S2~ is now e~cpressed in terms of the 'news' componenta of
mt-i (i-1,2,...t) and mt~ (i-0,1,2,...,t). Inserting equation (12) in the public's
preference function (7), postulating a reduced form solution for Ept ~ Slt:
~ ~
Ept ~~t - i~laiyt-i } i~Ocizt-i '
~yt-i } (1~)zt-i
which is linear in the 'news' terms with undetermined ~cients ai and ci, and
minimizing the expected aquared forecast errors (ptiEpt~S2t) with respect to the
coefficients ai and ci leads to the rational expectations formula:
E St~ -
(1-b) ( oÉf op)
E 6~
ptl t aÉ f bo~ L i-0 ~
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Substituting (14a) into (12) and using (l0a), (lOb) and (11) results in:
I ~ - ( 1-6)(1~ ) a P Emt !tt
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a ao
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which derives the optimal prediction of the unobservable current planned money- 11 -
growth as a weighted average of the current announcement mi and the expectation
of planned money growth conditional on past information EmP ~ SIt-1 with weights
that sum to unity. The expectation Emp ~ Slt-1 itself is given by a weighted average
of the expectation of planned money growth conditional on the past history of actual
00
money growth,
EmP~(mt-1'mt-1~"')- (1-~ i~0~ mt-1-i~ ~d the expectation of
planned money growth wnditional on the past history of monetary announcements,
00
Emp ~(mt-l,mE-2,...) -(1-~ ' E Ob~ mt-1-i, with weights which again sum to unity.
The weight placed on each term depends on o~ Noisy announcements with large o~
reduce the usefulness of announcements, so the public pays leas attention to them. In
the limit as o~ -~ oo , 9 y 1 and announcements are ignored since observing a
completely noisy signal provides no information at all. In this case the optimal
predictor of planned money growth mP in (15) reduces to:
00
Emp ~ 52ti - EmP I(mt-1'mt-2~...) -(1-b) ' E Oó~ mt-1-i ' (16)
which is identical to the exponentially weighted forecast derived in Muth (1960). At
the other extreme, for the limiting case of o~ -~ 0, announcements are completely
accurate statements of planned money growth. Since as a~ y 0, O-a 0, r-. o0
and b-~ 0, the optimal predictor of mp is equal to the current announcement:
Emp ~ f2t - mti . (17)
In this case the current announcement is fully credible. Cukierman 8c Meltzer (1986)
show that this remaina true even if oÉ is relatively large and hence monetary control
is relatively poor.- 12 -
2.2. The Credibility of Monetary Announcements Under Rational Expectations
Cukierman 8c Meltzer (1986a) use the optimal predictor of money growth in (15)
to define two measures of credibility, average and mazginal credibility. Average
credibility measures the extent to which the public's expectations of current planned
money growth (Emp~S2t) deviate from the current announcement (m~):
Average Credibility - AC -- ~ mt - Emp~fZti ~. (18)
The smaller the deviation (mt-Emp~S2t), the lazger is average credibility and for
mL-Emp~Slt average credibility is perfect. Using equation (15) average credibility can
be expressed as:
AC - - a ~ma - E b~ {(1-~[Om - -.f(1-8)ma- -']}, (19)
6-F(1-b)(1-0) t i-0 l t 1 i t 1 i J
6
- - (mt-Emt I (mt-1'mt-2~...) ~- la Ebt I (bt-1'bt-2~...)l ,
áf(1-b)(1-A) J
Average credibility is perfect for 6-0 (and hence lim ryoo), which is the case for
both perfect monetary control (0É-0) or fully precise announcements (o~0).
Furthermore, credibility is perfect if the current announcement is identical to the
prior expectation of the announcement conditional on past information, Em~ ~~t-1'
which is given by the expectation of the announcement conditional on past
announcements Emi ~(mt-l,mt-2,...) corrected for the expected announcement bias
conditional on the past history of the bias Ebt ~(bt-1'bt-2,...). The 'weight' or
regression coefficient [0-v~(o~~-oÉ)] attached to the expected bias here is given by
the ratio of the covariance between the announcement and the bias (Bza~ and the
variance of the bias (Bz(o~foÉ)]. Thus, whilst large unexpected changes in
announcements lead to a direct decrease in AC, lazge unexpected changes in actual
money growth influence AC only with a time lag through the increase in the- 13 -
expectations of the bias. Therefore, if policymakers aim at maintaining a given level
of average credibility under asymmetric information, a shift in the government's
policy preferences xt is unlikely to be revealed to the public in the form of aurprise
announcements and is more likely to result in surprise money growth.
While the above measure of average credibility focuses on the difference between
the current announcement and beliefs, the concept of marginal credibility focuses on
the ability of current announcements to influence expectations. Marginal credibility in
Cukierman 8z Meltzer (1986a) is defined as:
BEmt ~~t Marginal Credibility - MC - ,
8mt
(20)
which measures the extent to which a unit change in the announcement mt affects
the public's expectations of money growth Emt ~ Stt. From equation (15) it is obvious





and depends on the magnitude of the variance oÉ of the money control error relative
to the variance oÉfa~ of the announcement bias. If the policymaker always makes
completely accurate announcements (o~0), this measure of marginal credibility is
equal to unity. If, on the other hand, the policymaker makes extremely noisy
announcements and the vaziance of new information conveyed by the announcement
approaches infinity (lim o~-~oo), the announcements will be disregazded in
expectatíon formation since their information content is zero and marginal credibílity
will equal zero. In general, the greater the variance o~, the less credible the
announcement becomes.
Before turning to the empirical implementation of the above credibility measures,- 14 -
some comments on related game-theoretic models of policymaking aze in order. As
discussed by Cukierman 8s Meltzer (1986b), their model is closely related to the
models of Barro 8a Gordon [(1983a), (1983b)] on the one side and the modela of
Backus 8z Driffill [(1985a), (1985b)] on the other side. With the latter it shares the
asymmetric information about policymakers objectives, but while in the Backus 8c
Driffill model there are two types of policymakers that never change, the Cukierman
8~ Meltzer model, like the Barro 8c Gordon model, builds on policymakers preferences
that change over time. Consequently, while the observation of an inflationary bias in
the Backus 8c Driffill model reveals the true (weak) type of government and for the
rest of the game eliminates asymmetric information and credibility,5 defined as the
probability of a non-inflationary (hard-nosed) government, non~ero credibility and
an inflationary bias can coincide in the Cukierman 8t Meltzer model. Therefore, the
concept of credibility developed by Cukierman 8z Meltzer (1986a), which relates
credibility to the divergence of policy actions from policy announcements can be
expected to have more descriptive realism because an inflationary bias was the rule
rather than the exception in the western industrialized countries during the 1970's
and 1980's.
3. The Empirical Implementation of the Credibility Hypotheees
In order to derive an empirical counterpart to the above credibility measures, the
modelling of the public's expectations formation process is required. In the present
study a two--step approach is adopted: firstly the optimal time series expectations of
the unobservable planned money growtó rate conditional on past information,
EmP~S2t-1, are derived by using signal extraction methods. Secondly, the rational
expectations of money growth under incomplete contemporary information,
SWeber (1988c) provides some empirical evidence on the theoretical credibility measures
derived in a class of models of the Backus 8c Driffill [(1985a) (1985b)] type.- 15 -
Emt~l2t-Emp~S2t, are derived by incorporating the current announcement into the
above time series expectations.
3.1. Implementing the Univariate Time Series Expectations.
In implementing the expectation of planned money growth conditional on past
information, Emp ~ 12t-1, m equation (15), the two univariate time series expectations
Emp~(mt-l,mt-2,...) and EmP~(mt-l,mt-2,...) have to be quantified. In the former
case, consider the following 'state space' or 'dynamic linear model':
P
mt - mt } ~t ' E~t ~ ~t-1-0'
mP - mt-1 } pt } 7t ' E7t ~~t-1-0'
~`t - ~`t-1 } ~t ' E~t ~ ~t-1-o'
E(ft~t) I ~t-1-a~ ' (22a)
E(7t?'t) I ~t-1-ay , 22b)
E(~Gt~Gt) ~ ~t-1-o~i , (22c)
which results from equations (l0a) and (6a) to (6c) by defining ~t-Bet' ryt-vt~B'
pt-st~B and ~it-wt~B. In the measurement equation (22a) the non-observable state
of the government's planned money growth rate mP is contained in the observable
signal mt, which is contaminated by a measurement error ~t. Furthermore, the
dynamic process for the state variable mp is captured by the transition equations
(22b) and (22c), which describe mP as a random walk process with stochastic drift
pt, which itself follows a random walk.
For the expectations of planned money growth conditional to the hiatory of past
announcements, Emp~(mt-l,mt-2,...) a second 'atate space' model is considered:
mt - mi } ~t ' E~t ~ ~t-1-0'
P - P
mt mt-1 } pt } 7t ' E7t~~t-1-0'
pt - pt-1 } ~t ' E~t ~ ~t-1-0'
~ E ~tc~t Slt-1-o~ ,
E(7tyti)I~t-1-a~ ,




which resulta from equations (lOb) and (6a) to (6c) by defining mt-Bpt' 7t-vt~B'
pt-st~B and ~it-wt~B. Note that equations (23a) to (23c) implicitly assume that- 16 -
innovations in actual and announced money growth have the same time frequency.
While the present study uses monthly data on actual money growth, the common
practice with monetary announcements is to issue annual announcements of a money
growth target, except in the case of Japan, where quazterly projections aze announced
or the United States, where even weekly announcements are issued. Thus, while
announcements typically provide a lowfrequency signal, observations on actual money
growth provide a high frequency signal. In terms of equations (23a) to (23c) this
implies that for announcements to be a noisy and random signal of planned money
growth [Ewt ~ S2t-1-0, E(wtwt) ~ S2t-1-o~, planned money growth must be postulated
to exhibit only permanent level shocks ryt and no permanent first difference shocks pt
(0~-0). Furthermore, permanent level shocks ryt are allowed to occur only in twelve
period intervals and have to be identically equal to zero at all periods in between.
Formally, this implies ryt-i-0 and o~ o~~Bz-O for all i-1,2,...11 and ryt-i~0 and
a~o~~Bz~O for i-0. Hence monetary announcements have a positive information
content, as reflected by the signal mt-Emt ~(mt-l,mi-2,...), only every twelve periods
and in between these periods the information content of annual announcements is
zero. As a result, past announcements will tend to be disregarded in expectations
formation and only the current announcement will be used as an information variable
if planned money growth is a high frequency state variable and if the high frequency
observations of actual money growth provide a noisy signal of this non~bservable
state variable. In the empirical section evidence on this proposition will be provided.
In order to empirically extract an estimate of the non-observable state mp from
historical data of actual and announced money growth the multi-process Kalman
filter (MPKF) is employed. The MPKF, which is outlined in the Weber [(1988a),
(1988c)), is a highly fle.xible, time-varying learning algorithm and incorporates
feed-back mechanisms from the specification of the statiatical model to the data in
the form of both Bayesian and least-squares learning. Formally, this projection
method distinguishes between transitory and permanent movements in the state
variable mp by assigning a probability ~t') to the occurrence of each type of shock- 17 -
(~t' ryt and ~t) in equations (22a) to (22c) for each period t. Three different pure
process states aze postulated:
(a) purely transitory level shocks ft (a~~0, oy o~-0),
(b) purely permanent level shocks ryt (oy~0, a~-o~-0) and
(c) purely permanent first difference shocks ~it (0~~0, a~o~-o).
The projection of the state variable, EmP ~(mt-l,mt-2,...), is then derived as a
probability weighted average of the projections E(~)mP~(mt-l,mt-2,...) resulting from
the three pure process specifications (j-1,2,3), where O~aLI)~1 and E~rtl)-1 holds.
]
3.2. Implemmting the Expectations Conditional on Currmt Information.
In order to derive rational expectations of planned money growth conditional on
current and past information, EmP~S2t, a weighted average of the current monetazy
announcemmt m~ and the expectation of planned money growth conditional on past
information, EmP ~ S2t-1 is required:
Emp~~r - Q mt f(1-p) EmPI~t-1 ' (24)
The second component EmP~Stt-1 is derived as a weighted average of the univáriate
time series expectations of planned money growth based on past actual money growth
rates, Emp
~(mt-1'mt-1'"')' and the corresponding time series expectations of mp
based on past monetazy announcemmts, Emp-1
~(mt-1'mt-2'"')'
EmP
~~t-1 - a EmPI(mt-1'mt-2~...) f(1-a) Emp I(m~-1'mt-2~...), (25)
with weights that sum to unity. Empirically these expectations are derived in two
steps: firstly, a time series for Emp~ ftt-1 is constructed from the two univariate
projections Emp
~(mt-l,mt-2,...) and Emp ~(mt-l,mt-2,...), which result from applying
the MPKF to actual and announced money growth data, by iterating the relative- 18 -
weight a in the interval between zero and one. The resulting time series of
EmP ~ Stt-1 and the time series of current announcements mt aze then regressed on
actual money growth mt, which due to Emp ~ S2L-Emt ~ Stt is equivalent to minimizing
the expected squared deviation mtiEmt ~ S2~ and thus is identical to minimizing the
public's preference function in equation (7).
3.3. The Empirical Estimates of the Public's Rational Expectations.
In equation (22a) to (22c) the actual rate of money growth mt is modelled as
an ARIMA(0,2,2) time series process. Monthly data on money growth for Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States were calculated from the levels of the relevant monetary aggregates.s To
avoid seasonality in growth rates, the relative rate of change of the monetary




With monthly data for levels of Mt stazting in January 1970, the resulting time
series on money growth mt ranged from January 1971 to December 1987 for all
countries under study. Initializing the multi-process Kalman filter in January 1971
then gives univariate projections of planned money growth for February 1971 to
December 1987, which together with the actual and projected announcements are used
to implement the rational expectations conditional on current information. The results
of these estimates and the derived credibility measures will be discussed below.
Table 1. summazizes the empirical results when the public's rational expectations
of planned money growth Emp ~ S2L are formed by fitting the regression equation:
mt - Ql mt i- ~2 [aEmtl(mt-1'mt-2~...) f(1-~)Emtl(mt-1'mt-1~...)] f vt, (26)
óData on the levels of the relevant monetary aggregates for Germany (CBM), France (M2),
Italy (TDC~ ), the Netherlands (M2), the United States (M1,M3), Canada (M1), Japan
~M2~, the United Kingdom (M3), Australia (M3) and Switzerland (M1) were taken from
E D Main Economic Indicators, 1970-1989, di~ferent volumes. Data on the levels of the
adjuated monetazy base (MBA) for Switzerland were taken from Monatsberichte der
Schweizer Nationalbank, 1980-1989, different volumes.- 19 -
with vt as an normally independently distributed, serially uncorrelated random
variable with mean zero and constant finite vaziance az. Note that in equation (20)
actual money growth mt is regressed on announced money growth mi and on the
time series expectation Emt ~ S2t-1, which is generated as a weighted average of the
two time-series expectations Emt ~(mt-1'mt-2'"') and Emt~(rnt-1'mt-1~"') by
iterating a in the ]0,1[ interval. At this stage the coefficient restriction ,Ol-~~-1 is
not imposed and the unrestricted form of equation (20) is estimated.
The first results appazent form table 1 is that the least~quares estimate of a is
equal to unity in eight out of eleven cases and near to unity for Australia (a-0.85),
and the United States (M1, a-0.94).7 Hence the empirical estimates are consistent
with the above presumption that the information content of past monetary
announcements is either zero or close to zero. Secondly, a closer look at the results
reveals that the lower the estimate of a, the lower the estimate of the coefficient Ql
and the higher the estimate of the ccefficient ~. Since therefore different estimates of
~ and ,131 are not comparable for different values of a, a-1 is assumed in all cases
for the remainder of the paper, that is the information content of past monetary
announcements is set equal to zero.
A further important result for table 1 is that for a-1 the regression ccefficients
,131 and (tz all lie in the interval between zero and one and almost exactly sum up to
unity,s as postulated by the theoretical model.9 Before turning to a more formal test
of this unity restriction on the regression coefficienta, some comments on the
unrestricted marginal credibility estimates in table 1 are in order: among the
countries with freely floating exchange rates the estimated marginal credibility of
~The only estimate of a relatively low ~(-0.57) is derived for the Netherlands, were the
central bank primarily followed an exchange rate target. Due to the inofficial chazacter of
the monetary target used here this result has to be interpreted with caution.
sToyoda (1974) demonstrates that the F-test of Chow (1960) is biased in the presence of
heteroscedastisity. See also Jaytissa (1977~ and Schmidt 8c Sickles (1977) on this point. For
problems of the Chow test under misspeci ication see Thursby ( 1982).
gI'his is true in all cases if the sum of the two regression ccefficients is compazed to a value
of one plus~minus the sum of the standazd errors of the two regression coefficients.-20-
Table 1.: Mean Square Eetimate of the Weighting Factor a
by Ordinary Least Squares It,egre~sion
Start a (3~ ,6z RZ DW SEE
End t(Ql) t(~) Rad~ SQR LOGL
D(CBM) 75M2 1 0.1010 0.9116 0.963 2.250 0.450
(n-155) 87M12 (4.19) (45.65) 0.963 31.00 -510.3
F(M2) 77M2 1 0.1027 0.9102 0.903 2.236 0.763
(n-131) 87M12 (2.97) (28.87) 0.902 75.12 ~161.2
I(TDC) 77M2 1 0.1031 0.8896 0.898 2.133 1.856
(n-130) 87M11 (4.20) (35.00) 0.897 440.7 -507.8
NL (M1) 79M2 .57 -0.382 1.3711 0.539 2.275 1.491
(n-107) 87M12 (3.94) (14.31) 0.534 233.5 -1107.8






- - - -
0.2111




- - - -
2.267
- - - -
1.494
(n-107) 87M12 (3.69) (14.29) 0.533 234.2 ~07.9
J(M2CD) 78M8 1 0.2730 0.7319 0.950 1.676 0.364
(n-113) 87M12 (4.10) (11.10) 0.950 14.70 -361.5
CH (MBA) 81M2 1 0.2482 0.6081 0.382 1.805 1.842
(n- 83) 87M12 (2.82) ( 8.07) 0.374 274.8 -323.8
USA (M1) 75M2 .94 0.1081 0.9395 0.893 2.029 0.941
(n-155) 87M12 (2.90) (38.25) 0.892 135.5 -560.0






- - - -
0.1637




- - - -
2.030
- - - -
0.941
(n-155) 87M12 (4.56) (38.24) 0.892 135.6 -560.0
USA (M3) 75M2 1 0.0712 0.9390 0.947 1.998 0.400
(n-155) 87M12 (3.62) (60.00) 0.947 24.45 ~502.3
GBR (M3) 76M5 1 0.1268 0.9224 0.913 2.058 1.603
(n-131) 87M3 (3.36) (39.75) 0.912 331.5 ~503.5
CAN (M1) 75M5 1 0.2288 0.7744 0.834 1.835 2.070
(n-152) 87M12 (5.91) (23.95) 0.833 642.6 ~Ol.l
AUS (M3) 76M9 .85 0.0643 0.9631 0.825 2.106 0.772
(n-101) 85M1 (1.32) (22.36) 0.823 58.95 -356.0






- - - -
0.2076




- - - -
2.119
- - - -
0.775
(n-101) 85M1 (4.87) (22.25) 0.822 59.46 -356.2
Key: numbers in parenthesis below parameter estimates
are absolute t-values- 21 -
monetary announcements is highest for Japan (0.27), followed by Switzerland (0.25),
Canada (0.23) and Australia (0.21) and lowest for M3 of the United States (0.07),
the United Kingdom (0.13) and M1 of the United States (0.16). Within the group of
countries participating in the fixed exchange rate system of the EMS for pazt of the
sample period the estimate of marginal credibility of monetazy announcements is
relatively high for the Netherlands (0.21) and almost identical for Germany (0.10),
France (0.10) and Italy (0.10). Note that in all cases the credibility of monetary
announcements is far from being perfect (MC-1). Nevertheleas the effect of current
monetary announcements on the public's expectations is significa,ntly different from
zero in all cases above. Hence, although monetary announcements did not completely
fail to provide the public with some information about the future course of policy,
there is still room improving their credibility.
Before analysing the credibility of monetazy policy announcements in detail, some
comments on the problems of empirical policy evaluation, frequently labeled the
'Lucas critique', are in order, especially as ahift in government's policy objectives are
a building block of the Cukierman 8e Meltzer (1986a) model, which underlies the
estimates. According to the 'Lucas critique', the structure of the econometric model
used for evaluating policies in general is not invariant to changes in real world policy
objectives, operating procedures or policy oonstraints in the course of time, especially
if these models involve the public's rational expectations of policy outcomes. Hence
econometric models frequent exhibit structural breaka, if policy changes are of the
once-and-for-all type, or structural parameters that follow stationary or
non-stationary processes if policy changes occur more gradually. In the sample period
analysed here, the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978 in the United States, the
institution of the EMS in March 1979 in France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
or the change in the Fed's operating procedures in October 1979 and again in
October 1982 in the United States, to mention but a few examples, represent such
policy induced structural breaks. It therefore has to be checked whether or not the-22-
above results aze subject to the 'Lucas critique'.lo
In table 2 the coefficient estimates and parametric stability tests of the
unrestricted model for a-1 are reported at the most likely point of structural break,
which is estimated by switching regression on the basis of the likelihood ratio test
(-21na6) of Quandt [(1958), (1960)J and Goldfeld 8c Quandt [(1973), (1976)].11 In
addition, the test Fk,t-2~ of Chow (1960) for the constancy of the regression
cceffícients with k and t-2k degrees of freedom ia performed.i2 Furthermore, two
versions of the CUSUM~f-Squares test13 of Brown, Durbin 8z Evans (1976), a forward
test CFZ and a backwazd test CB~, as well as two F-tests for heteroscedastisity,
Ho,m and Hs,o-t, are reported.14 The relevance of the 'Lucas critique' can therefore be
judged on a vaziety of tests and is accepted only if the majority of the parametric
tests indicate significant instabilities.
Significant structural breaks in the estimated relation are indicated by the
majority of tests for Germany, Switzerland and the United States. For Germany, the
most likely point of structural break is September 1977. Even though the null
loAt the present stage, only one major structural break in the sample period is tested for by
applying a variety of parametric stability tests under the null hypothesis of 'no change in
the estimated relation', which covers both constant regression ccefficients and homoscedas-
tisity. Tests for time-varying parameter models such as random ccefficient or random walk
coefficient models as derived on the basis of the Kalman filter in Weber ( 1988b) from
Cooley (1971), Cooley 8c Prescott [(1973a), (1973b), ( 1973c), (1976)] or Hazvey (1981b) aze
planned in a subsequent paper.
11As analysed in Quandt (1960), the test statistic -21na6 does not follow a X2 distribution.
However, Lehner 8e Mbller (1981) demonstrate that a modified XZ distribution can be used
to conatruct a conservative test for s structural break points. This modified Xz distribution
is used here to evaluate the significance of -21nas.
1zToyoda (1974) demonstrates that the F-test of Chow ( 1960) is biased in the presence of
heteroscedastisity. See also Jaytissa (1977) and Schmidt 8c Sickles (1977) on this point. For
problems of the Chow test under miaspeci{ication see Thursby ( 1982).
13See Brown, Durbin 8c Evans (1975), pp. 152. The forwazd (backwazd) tests CFZ (CB2)
are based on a plot of the cumulated sum or recuraive least squares residuals from the
Kalman filter run against up r and lower significance bounds for different significance
levels, as reprinted in Hazvey ~981a), pp 364.
14Hm,o is the Goldfeld 8z Quandt ( 1965) heteroscedastisity test based on a division of the
sample of t observations into two sub~amples of m and n(-t-m) observations and the
assumption that the variance of residuals increases over time. It corresponds to the test of
Harvey 8t Phillips ( 1974) if no central observations are ommitted. Alternatively, the
heteroscedastiaity test H6it-~ assumes the variance of the residuala to be proportional to the
fitted values and is based on a regreasion of squared residuals on squared fitted values.- 23 -
Table 2: Pazametric Stability Testa and Ordinary Least Squaree
Estimates at the Maet Likely Point of Structural Break
of the Regression Equation in the Unrestricted Model
Start ~ ~ Rz DW Parametric
End t(Qi) t(~) Rad~ SQR Stability Test
D(CBM) 75M2 0.1010 0.9116 0.963 2.250 Fz,151 - 4.51'
t-155 87M12 (4.19) (45.66) 0.963 31.00 -21na1 - 6.12
D(CBM) 75M2 0.2929 0.7255 0.719 1.865 CF'z -0.261'
n- 32 77M9 (3.23) ( 8.76) 0.710 8.249 CBz -0.677'
D(CBM) 77M10 0.0932 0.9223 0.971 2.333 Hn,m -0.626
m-123 87M12 (3.73) (46.65) 0.971 21.01 Hl,lg3 -2.786
F(M2) 77M2 0.1027 0.9102 0.903 2.236 Fz,1z7 - 8.43s'
t-131 S7M12 (2.97) (28.87) 0.902 75.12 -21na1 - 8.15'
F(M2) 77M2 0.1772 0.8305 0.650 2.293 CFz -0.495
n- 81 83M10 (3.18) (15.27) 0.646 37.18 CBz -0.388
F(M2) 83M11 0.3999 0.7465 0.859 2.149 Hn,m -1.263
m- 50 87M12 (3.89) (11.15) 0.856 29.13 Hl,lz9 -0.402
I(TDC) 77M2 0.1031 0.8896 0.898 2.133 Fz,izs - 0.47
t-130 87M11 (4.20) (35.00) 0.897 440.7 -21na1 - 1.28
I(TDC) 77M2 0.0847 0.9025 0.909 2.540 CFz -0.492
n- 53 81M6 (2.42) (25.20) 0.907 217.0 CBz -0.500
I(TDC) 81M7 0.1300 0.8669 0.880 1.552 Hn,m -0.682
m- 77 87M11 (3.56) (22.65) 0.878 220.5 Hl,lzy -3.659
NL (M2) 79M2 0.2111 0.7796 0.537 2.268 Fz,to3 - 0.52
t-107 87M12 (3.69) (14.29) 0.533 234.2 -21na1 - 7.43
NL (M2) 75M5 0.2548 0.3724 0.761 1.883 CFz -0.001
n- 4 79M3 (5.76) ( 2.52) 0.641 40.92 CBz -0.990
NL (M2) 79M6 0.2411 0.7545 0.484 2.227 Hn,m -72.61~
m-103 87M12 (3.63) (12.25) 0.479 231.8 Hl,ioS -5.292s
J(M2-~CD) 78M8 0.2730 0.7319 0.950 1.676 Fziioy - 6.16"
t-113 87M12 (4.10) (11.10) 0.950 14.70 -21n~1 - 6.63
J(M2fCD) 78M8 0.0228 0.9699 0.966 2.048 CFz -0.255
n- 33 81M4 (0.20) ( 8.75) 0.965 3.75 CBz -0.643
J(M2i-CD) 81M5 0.3950 0.6172 0.917 1.780 Hn,m -0.990
m- 80 87M12 (5.11) ( 8.05) 0.916 9.458 Hl,lil -0.239
Key: numbers in parenthesis below parameters are absolute t-values,
'(~) indicates significant instability at 5l0 (lq) levels.-24-
Table 2 continued
CH (MBA) S1M2 0.2482 0.6081 0.382 1.805 Fzi7s - 4.21s
t- 83 87M12 (2.83) ( 8.07) 0.374 274.8 -21nat -10.18'
CH (MBA) 81M2 0.1108 0.7512 0.524 1.873 CF'z -0.527~
n- 24 83M1 (0.70) ( 5.16) 0.502 144.7 CBz -0.377~
CH (MBA) 83M2 0.5734 0.3374 0.194 1.703 Ho,m -0.272
m- 59 87M12 (5.20) ( 3.73) 0.180 103.6 H1i81 -0.366
USA (M1) 75M2 0.1637 0.8836 0.893 2.030 Fz,151 - 0.74
t-155 87M12 (4.56) (38.24) 0.892 135.6 -21na1 -10.62'
USA (M1) 75M2 0.1127 0.9093 0.810 2.620 CFz -0.162~
n- 60 SOM1 (2.31) (24.53) 0.810 21.98 CBz -0.828~
USA (M1) SOM2 0.1934 0.8710 0.888 1.911 Hn,m -3.152~
m- 95 87M12 (3.79) (28.49) 0.886 112.3 H1,i53 -3.628
USA (M3) 75M2 0.0712 0.9390 0.947 1.998 Fz,lsl - 2.95
t-155 87M12 (3.62) (60.00) 0.947 24.45 -21na1 -11.12s
USA (M3) 75M2 0.0353 0.9698 0.964 2.363 CF'z -0.165~
n- 57 79M10 (2.11) (67.31) 0.964 4.029 CBz -0.798~
USA (M3) 79M11 0.1348 0.8883 0.930 1.839 Ho,m -2.745~
m- 98 87M12 (3.56) (29.52) 0.930 19.50 Hl,l~ -2.464
GBR (M3) 76M5 0.1268 0.9224 0.913 2.058 Fz,lz~ - 5.18~`
t-131 87M3 (3.36) (39.75) 0.912 331.5 -21na1 - 8.56~
GBR (M3) 76M5 0.0783 0.9355 0.912 1.811 CFz -0.710
n- 79 82M11 ( 1.76) (35.13) 0.911 235.2 CBz -0.215
GBR (M3) 82M12 0.3638 0.7964 0.937 2.402 Ho,m -0.458
m- 52 87M3 (4.26) (14.36) 0.936 71.33 Hl,lzs -1.210
CAN (M1) 75M5 0.2288 0.7744 0.834 1.835 Fz,l.~ - 2.32
t-152 87M12 (5.91) (23.95) 0.833 642.6 -21na1 - 3.46
CAN (M1) 75M5 0.2751 0.7162 0.819 1.738 CF'z -0.712
n- 97 83M5 (5.57) (15.92) 0.817 457.5 CBz -0.258
CAN (M1) 83M6 0.1620 0.8524 0.877 2.023 Ho,m -0.637
m- 55 87M12 (2.49) (19.41) 0.874 165.6 Hl,l~ -2.445
AUS (M3) 76M9 0.2076 0.8197 0.823 2.119 Fz,s7 - 7.82~
t-101 85M1 (4.87) (22.25) 0.822 59.46 -21na1 - 7.29
AUS (M3) 76M9 0.1074 0.9045 0.912 1.818 CFz -0.305
n- 37 79M9 (2.29) (21.99) 0.910 18.13 CBz -0.556
AUS (M3) 79M10 0.4571 0.6070 0.459 1.935 Ho,m -1.014
m- 64 85M1 (6.09) ( 9.42) 0.451 33.08 H~,ss -4.969s-25-
hypothesis of homoscedastisity cannot be rejected, the majority of the remaining
stability tests indicate a structural break at a 5 percent significance level. For
Switzerland the estimated most likely point of structural break is January 1983. Like
in the German case above there is no indication of heteroscedasticity, but all
remaining stability tests are significant at least at the 5 percent level. For the
United States two monetary aggregates are considered. The most likely point of
structural break in estimated relation for the broader aggregate M3 is October 1979,
when the Fed announced the adoption of new operating procedures and a stricter
adherence to announced monetary tazgets. For the narrower aggregate M1 the
estimated structural break is slightly later in January 1980, when for the first time
after the adoption of the new policy stance the actual rate of money growth fell
within the newly announced target range. All relevant stability tests are significant at
least at the 5 percent leve115, indicating that the October 1979 change of the Fed's
operating procedures was indeed a major structural break in the conduct of United
States monetary policy.
Given the above evidence on the relevance of the 'Lucas critique' for Germany,
Switzerland and the United States, a closer look at the estimates of marginal
credibility is now in order. For this purpose the coefficient restriction ~~-J31-1 is
imposed on the data and the adequacy of this restriction is tested. Table 3 presents
the restricted least squares estimates of the theoretical model with ~-1 at the most
likely points of structural break from table 2 with the F-test and marginal
significance level for the restriction reported in the last column.
The null hypothesis of ~f(f~-1 in the overall period can not be rejected at the
5 percent level for Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland and
Canada and additionally at the 1 percent level for the United States M3. In
addition, with the exception of the Netherlands all countries fulfill the above
IsThe significance of the heterosceda9tisity test Hm,,,, which indicates that the variance of
the residuals increases over time, is responsible for the bias in the F-test of Chow ( 1960),
which is therefore not considered here for reasons indicated in Toyoda ( 1974).-26-
Table 3: Mean Square Eatimate of Marginal Credibility by
Restricted Leaat Squares at the Eatimated Ma~st
Likely Point of Structural Break
Start (3~ ~ R2 DW F-TEST
End t((31) t((iz) Rad~ SQR SIG.
D(CBM) 75M2 0.0695 0.9305 0.964 2.324 3.471
n-155 87M12 (4.09) (54.78) 0.964 30.41 0.064
D(CBM) 75M2 0.2160 0.7839 0.747 2.171 1.852
n- 32 77M9 (3.27) (11.86) 0.747 7.430 0.184
D(CBM) 79M4 0.0567 0.9433 0.971 2.363 3.818
n-123 87M12 (3.47) (57.68) 0.971 20.54 0.053
F(M2) 77M2 0.0719 0.9281 0.906 2.203 3.123
n-131 87M12 (2.46) (31.75) 0.906 72.52 0.080
F(M2) 77M2 0.1602 0.8398 0.640 2.227 0.595
n- 81 83M10 (2.99) (15.69) 0.640 37.25 0.444
F(M2) 83M11 0.0426 0.9574 0.845 2.230 13.70
n- 50 87M12 (1.17) (26.22) 0.845 32.01 0.001
I(TDC) 77M2 0.1053 0.8947 0.906 2.282 0.491
n-130 87M11 (4.51) (38.36) 0.906 407.4 0.485
I(TDC) 77M2 0.0898 0.9102 0.921 2.880 0.596
n- 53 81M6 (2.82) (28.62) 0.921 189.2 0.443
I(TDC) 81M7 0.1305 0.8695 0.890 1.586 0.051
n- 77 87M11 (3.77) (25.10) 0.890 201.4 0.822
NDL (M1) 79M2 0.2188 0.7812 0.565 2.317 0.195
n-107 87M12 (4.17) (14.87) 0.565 220.1 0.659
NDL (Ml) 79M2 0.1395 0.8605 0.398 2.564 4.571
n- 22 80M11 (1.74) (10.73) 0.398 43.83 0.045
NDL (M1) 80M12 0.2789 0.7210 0.511 2.199 1.064
n- 85 87M12 (3.97) (10.27) 0.511 177.3 0.305
J(M2CD) 78M8 0.2569 0.7431 0.950 1.649 1.722
n-113 87M12 (3.94) (11.40) 0.950 14.74 0.192
J(M2CD) 78M8 0.0489 0.9511 0.966 1.875 1.601
n- 33 81M4 (0.45) ( 8.84) 0.966 3.71 0.215
J(M2CD) 81M5 0.3233 0.6767 0.912 1.676 7.652
n- 81 87M12 (4.26) ( 8.92) 0.912 10.15 0.007
Key: numbers in parenthesis below parameter estimates
are absolute t-values-27-
Table 3 continued
CH (MB) S1M2 0.3478 0.6522 0.382 1.815 3.908
n- 83 87M12 (4.86) ( 9.12) 0.374 274.8 0.051
CH (MB) 81M2 0.1883 0.8117 0.520 1.952 0.607
n- 24 83M1 (1.55) ( 6.70) 0.520 146.0 0.444
CH (MB) 83M2 0.6580 0.3420 0.188 1.658 1.796
n- 59 87M12 (7.32) ( 3.80) 0.188 104.5 0.185
USA (M1) 75M2 0.0774 0.9226 0.890 2.053 7.841
n-155 87M12 (4.14) (49.39) 0.890 140.0 0.006
USA (M1) 75M2 0.0658 0.9342 0.817 2.619 1.563
n- 60 80M1 (2.16) (30.71) 0.817 21.11 0.216
USA (M1) 80M2 0.0794 0.9206 0.892 1.930 6.308
n- 95 87M12 (3.49) (40.45) 0.982 108.0 0.014
USA (M3) 75M2 0.0400 0.9600 0.947 1.977 4.233
n-155 87M12 (3.20) (76.88) 0.947 24.39 0.041
USA (M3) 75M2 0.0222 0.9778 0.970 2.200 1.477
n- 57 79M10 (1.90) (83.57) 0.970 3.42 0.229
USA (M3) 79M11 0.0539 0.9461 0.930 1.940 6.075
n- 98 87M12 (2.89) (50.80) 0.930 19.17 0.015
GBR (M3) 76M5 0.0386 0.9614 0.910 2.002 7.081
n-131 87M3 (2.11) (52.63) 0.910 344.1 0.009
GBR (M3) 76M5 0.0559 0.9441 0.912 1.800 0.334
n- 79 82M11 (2.55) (43.13) 0.912 233.1 0.565
GBR (M3) 82M12 -0.025 1.025 0.923 2.318 23.42
n- 52 87M3 (0.79) (32.16) 0.923 87.83 0.00001
CAN (M1) 75M5 0.2257 0.7743 0.840 1.814 0.021
n-152 87M12 (7.14) (24.49) 0.840 619.4 0.885
CAN (M1) 75M5 0.2819 0.7181 0.826 1.745 0.104
n- 97 83M5 (6.49) (16.54) 0.826 438.3 0.748
CAN (M1) 83M6 0.1447 0.8553 0.891 2.192 0.127
n- 55 87M12 (3.60) (21.28) 0.891 146.5 0.723
AUS (M3) 76M9 0.1218 0.8782 0.826 2.153 8.556
n-101 85M1 (3.98) (28.71) 0.826 58.66 0.004
AUS (M3) 76M5 0.0850 0.9150 0.919 1.841 0.769
n- 37 79M9 (2.29) (24.62) 0.919 16.66 0.386
AUS (M3) 79M10 0.1640 0.8360 0.294 2.191 22.52
n- 64 85M1 (3.39) (17.26) 0.294 43.20 0.00001-28-
coefficient restriction at least at the 5 percent level in the first sub-period. Thus, the
evidence in table 3 suggests that in most cases unbiased estimates of the marginal
credibility of monetary target announcements can be obtained by applying restricted
least squares.~s In imposing the ccefficient restriction consistent estimates of the
marginal credibility measure of Cukierman 8c Meltzer (1986a) can be derived by
estimating the regression equation:
mt - Emt ~ Bt-1 - Qi ( mt - Emt ~~t-1) -F vt , (27)
which results in identical estimates of ,Ql as the restricted least squares regression
with ~-(1-~) from table 3 above.
4. The Empirical Estimates of Average and Mazginal Credibility.
In order to compare briefly the credibility measures between countries, table 4
and table 5 summarize the estimates of the marginal and average credibility of
monetary target growth announcements for each country in the overall sample period
and additionally in three pre-specified sub-samples.
Among the countries with freely fluctuating exchange rates throughout the
sample period the estimated mazginal credibility in the overall period is highest for
Switzerland (0.35) and Japan (0.26) and lowest for the United Kingdom (0.04) and
the United States (0.04 for M3, 0.07 for M1). A similar ranking can be derived from
the average credibility measure, which in the overall period is highest in Japan
(-0.32) and Switzerland (-1.22) and lowest in the United Kingdom (-5.70).
Furthermore, with the exception of M3 for the United States and MBA for
Switzerland the mazginal credibility of monetary announcements declined in most
countries with freely floating exchange rates between the early and late 1980s.
1sThe evidence from table 3 however does not suggest in cases where the ccefficient
restriction Qlf~-1 is rejected, that the theoretical model is rejected by the data, which
would be the case for ~31-0 and ~-0. It rather points towards the fact that additional
policy objectives, such as exchange rate considerations, matter in those cases.-29-
Table 4: Maz~nal Credibility of Money Gmwth Tazget
Announcements in Selected Periods
Start Start 79M4 84M1
End 79M3 83M12 End
D(CBM) 0.0695 ( 9) 0. 0655 ( 8) 0.1066 ( 8) 0.0486 (8)
F(M2) 0.0719 (8) 0.4688 (1) 0.1034 (9) 0.0421 (9)
I(TDC) 0.1053 (6) 0.0677 (~ 0.1810 (4) 0.0970 (5)
NL (M1) 0.2188 (4) (-) 0.1776 (5) 0.2947 (2)
J(M2CD) 0.3111 (2) 0.3111 (2) 0.3163 (1) 0.0575 (7)
CH (MBA) 0.3478 (1) (-) 0.2925 (2) 0.7095 (1)
USA (M 1) 0.0774 ( 7) 0.0858 ( 6) 0.1622 (6) 0.0396 (10)
USA (M3) 0.0400 (11) 0.0313 (9) 0.0275 (11) 0.0901 (6)
GBR (M3) 0.0386 (10) 0.1672 (4) 0.0412 (10) -0.021 (11)
CAN (M1) 0.2257 (3) 0.2851 (8) 0.2558 (~4) 0.1410 (~)
AUS (M3) 0.1218 (5) 0.1080 (5) 0.1378 (~ 0.1043 (4)
Table 5: Average Credibility of Money Growth Tazget
Announcementa in Selected Periods
start start 79M4 84M1
end 79M3 83M12 end
D (CBM) -1.48 (8) -1.88 (4) -1.15 (2) -1.50 (.?)
F (M2) -1.64 (5) -0.72 (2) -1.25 (~4) -2.58 ( ?)
I (TDC) -4.54 (10) -7.83 (9) -3.81 (10) -3.41 (9)
NL (M1) -1.62 (4) - (-) -1.55 (4) -1.60 (5)
J (M2CD) -0.30 (1) -0.21 (1) -0.37 (1) -0.23 (1)
CH (MBA) -1.22 (2) - (-) -2.07 (6) -0.60 (2)
USA (M 1) -2.94 (8) -1.86 (3) -2. 75 (8) -4.27 (10)
USA (M3) -2.15 (7) -2.31 (6) -2.51 (~ -1.59 (4)
GBR (M3) -5.70 (I1) -3.32 (8) -7.39 (11) -5.22 (11)
CAN (M1) -3.04 (9) -2.52 (7) -3.43 (9) -3.11 (8)
AUS (M3) -1.79 (6) -2.15 (5) -1.57 (5) -2.01 (6)-30-
Among those countriee paztiápating in the fixed exchange rate system of the
EMS after Mazch 1979 the estimate of marginal credibility of monetary target
announcements in the overall sample period is highest for the Netherlands (0.22) and
lowest for Germany (0.07), France (0.07) and Italy (0.11). On the other hand the
average credibility of monetary announcements in the overall period is highest for
Germany (-1.48) and the Netherlands (-1.62) and lowest for Italy (-4.54) and France
(-1.64). Furthermore, with the exception of M2 for the Netherlands the marginal
credibility of monetary announcements declined in the EMS member countries
between the early and late 1980s.
Summazizing it can be stated that the evidence suggests that regardless of
whether judgement is made on the basis of the relative success of past monetazy
targeting in meeting the pre-announced policy objectives (AC measure) or by the
impact of announcements on the public's expectation formation processes (MC
measure), the central banka of Japan and Switzerland were able to built up some
credibility, while the British central bank was not successful in doing so. All
remaining ca9es aze less cleazcut and will therefore be discussed in more depth below.
The United States.
In the United States the implementation of monetary policy underwent three
major changes with respect to the role of monetary growth target announcements in
the sample period. The firat, though minor change resulted from the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act of 1978, which required the Fed to establish calendar yeaz growth
targets to prevent the phenomenon of intra-year 'base drift~. Secondly, on October 6,
1979, the Fed announced its intention to adopt a more monetarist policy stance with
strict adherence to M1 targets (and the abandonment of interest rate tazgets) in
order to reduce the inflation rate. Three years later, on October 5, 1982, this strict
monetarist policy was officially changed and the Fed decided to 'de~mphasis~ M1 in
favour of the broader aggregates, M2 and M3, but re-iterated its commitment to low
inflation. Thus, as postulated in the paper of Loeys (1984), October 1979 and- 31 -
October 1982 should have produced opposite movements in the estimates of the
(mazginal) credibility measure.
Figures 1 and figure 2 show the actual (mt), expected (Emt~ftt) and announced
(mti) growth rates for M1 and M3, while the time-paths of the mazginal credibility
of the M1 and M3 growth rate announcements is depicted in figure 3.
The credibility measure for M1 increases in 1975 and 1976, when M1 grew inaide
the announced target range and falls drastically betweEn early 1977 and late 1979,
when M1 accelerated and consistently grew above the announced tazget range. The
estimate in figure 3 therefore is consistent with Axilrod's (1985) judgment that in
1977 and 1978 "the credibility of policy was being eroded by the consistency at which
MI growth came in above adopted target ranges".17 In October 1979 this downward
trend of the credibility of M1 announcements is brought to a standstill by the
adoption of the new policy stance with closer adherence to the announced target
paths. Despite some wavering in 1980, the record shows that M1 on the whole
followed the target path until mid 1982.is As a result, the credibility measure rises
between early 1980 and mid 1982. This supports Axilrod's (1985) view that "the
willingness to stick to the new procedure through a very difj~cult and volatile period
greatly increased the Federal Reserve's credibility in fighting inflation".19 The estimates
clearly indicate these credibility effects arising from the Fed's October 1979
commitment to monetary targeting. Furthermore, they show that these credibility
effects are only minor in the period between October 1979 to December 1980, but
relatively large in the first half of 1981, when the new Reagan administration was
elected.20 This in turn supports the views of Blanchard [(1984), (1987)], who states
that "while monetary disinflation wns set in motion under Carter, the role of Reagan
17Axilrod (1985), p. 15.
~sThis conclusion is also reached by Duesenberry (1983), P. 135.
19Axilrod (1985), p. 18.
20This corresponds to the "direct evidence" on financial mazket beliefs, a set of comments
of market partícipants and analysts found in the Business Week, quoted by Blanchazd
(1984).- 32 --33-
was to give it more credibility."21 It is furthermore consistent with the results of
Hardouvelis 8e Barnhart (1987), who find that "the October i979 announcement of a
policy change did not provide the FederaJ Reserue with instant credibility in the
market. InJlationary fears appear to have been present for at least a year. The Fed
established credibility slowly over time, apparently aJier markets began verifying that
the new Fed policy was successful at reducing the ínfintion rate."22 The credibility of
M1 announcements in figure 1 continues to rise until around July 1982, when MI
growth accelerated above the upper target range and the Fed again appears to have
made a major change in its operating procedures, as Friedman (1985) states.z3 This
21Blanchard (1987), p 19.
z2Hardouvelis 8c Barnhart (1987), p 11.
23See Friedman (1985), p. 23 on this point.-34-
change in policy objectives was confirmed by the October 1982 Fed announcement,
when the credibility measure for M1 announcements already atarted to decline.
Therefore, the empirical evidence presented here supports the above proposition, that
the October 1979 policy change had a positive and the October 1982 policy change
had a negative impact on the credibility of M1 growth tazget announcements. The
results presented here therefore supplement the results of Hardouvelis 8a Barnhart
(1987), who auspected but found no evidence on credibility effects arising from this
latter policy shift.24
A second interesting result from figure 3 ia that the credibility of the M3 target
announcements remained lower than that of the M1 target announcement even after
October 1982, suggesting that until its abolition in 1987 M1 remained the primarily
targeted monetary aggregate. However, while the credibility of M1 target
announcementa decreased after October 1982, when M1 targets were 'de-emphasised',
the credibility of the M3 tazget announcement increased, albeit only slightly. Both
findings support the view, that after 1982 the Fed did not replace M1 by M3
targets, but shifted from monetary tazgeting to interest rate tazgeting instead.25
Canada.
Canadian monetary policy during the late 1970's and early 1980's is usually
chazacterized by the term 'monetary gradualiam'. The monetary aggregate the bank
chose to control and announce tazget growth rates for was M1, currency outside
banks plus chartered demand deposits. M1 was controlled via alterations in
short-term interest rates, implying that the central bank aimed at controlling M1 via
a stable demand function for these balances. Furthermore, monetary target rates for
M1 were given priority over other policy considerations and M1 growth rate target
ranges were gradually reduced in annual intervals from an initial rage of 10-15
z4See Hazdouvelis 8c Baznhard (1987), p. 11.
zSThis return of the Fed to ita pre-1979 ractice of interest rate tazgeting in late 1982 is
stressed in Loeys (1984), p. 22, Friedman [~1985), p. 23, and Blanchazd (1987), p. 20.- 35 -
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percent in 1975~1976 down to 4-8 percent in 1980~1981, with a tazget corridor of
two percentage point deviations from the mid-point of the tazget range, as depicted
in figure 4. During the 1981~1982 recession the central bank shifted its policy
orientation more and more towards the exchange rate with the U.S. dollaz and in
November 1982 the official announcement that Ml tazgets were abandoned was made.2ó
To enable some inference for the post 1982 period the present study assumes that the
Canadian central bank unofficially continued its 1982 M1 growth targeta, which can
partly be justified on the grounds that Canadian M1 target announcementa were
typically made for an indefinite period into the future.n
In figure 5 the credibility of Canadian M1 growth tazget announcements is as
high as the credibility of M1 growth announcements in the United States in the yeaz
to the end of 1976. The credibility of Canadian M1 announcements then continuously
increases during the period of "gradualism" between 1977 and mid 1981. In August
1981 there is a transitory decline in credibility due to a downwazd shift in the
demand for M1, which results in growth ratea of M1 well below the lower band of
the target for the rest of 1981 and most of 1982.28 Finally, after mid 1982 the
credibility measures of Canadian and American Ml~rowth target announcements
exhibit a similar pattern. Note however that Canada did not officially report a target
after 1982, so only little significance is attached to this result, which was derived by
assuming that Canada has unofficially continued its 1982 tazgets. However, the
co-movement of both Canadian and American credibility measures are consistent with
the co-movements of M1 growth rates in both countries, which resulted from the
260n this point see Howitt (1987), p.641, footnote 6.
27Johnson ( 1983) , p. 745 reports that Canadian M1 growth announcements were typically
made for an indefinite period into the future. Hence, it could be azgued that the latest
announced official target is still valid, as indicated by the Federal R.eserve Bank of St.
Louis, "International Economic Conditions", volume August 1982, page 7(Targeted
Monetary Aggregates),footnote 1.
~On the reasons for and effects of this downward shift of demand for M1 in Canada after
August 1981 see also Thiessen ( 1982), p. 104.-37-
Bank of Canada's post 1982 policy atance of targeting the bilateral exchange rate
with the U.S. dollar.29
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom monetazy targets were used internally by the Bank of
England from 1973 onwards, but were first announced publicly for the monetary
aggregate M3 in the Budget of 1976 and for Sterling M3 in the Budgets from 1977
onwards. For the 1974-1979 Labour Government these monetary targets, published in
six month intervals and instituted in conjuncture with an IMF support azrangement
requesting upper ceilings on credit expansion, were, however, only one part of an
anti-inflation programme which relied primarily on income policies. After the election
of the Conservative Party under Thatcher in May 1979, the new government gave
priority to controlling the growth of monetary aggregates, at the time exclusively of
Sterling M3, as the centrepiece of its new economic policy. The March 1980 Budget
then established the ~Medium Term Financial Strategy' (MTFS), an annually renewed
five year forward-looking plan of gradually lowering inflation by limiting the growth
of monetary aggregates and subordinating fiscal policy to the achievement of the
monetary target. At the same time financial mazkets were de-regulated and foreign
exchange controls and direct credit controls, the so~alled 'Corset', were abolished. In
the March 1982 Budget a multiplicity of monetary targets was adopted and growth
targets were announced for Sterling M3, M1 and Private Sector Liquidity (PSL2). In
addition the importance of the exchange rate was explicitly mentioned, indicating a
move to a more discretionary policy stance. Then after the March 1984 Budget
target ranges for both Sterling M3 and MO were announced and the Sterling M3
target was finally abolished in March 1987, when the Bank of England switched to
announcing target ranges for MO a9 the main monetary aggregate. In addition, the
Bank of England during most of 1987 held the value of the Pound Sterling in a
z9See Johnson (1983), pp. 752.-38-
na.rrow range to the German Mazk (close to 3 Deutsche Mark~Pound Sterling),
unofficially adopting a policy of `ahadow targeting' the exchange rate.
In figure 6 the mazginal ctedibility measure of the Sterling M3 target growth
announcement is relatively high in the initial period, when in 1976 and during the
first half of 1977 money growth stayed well within the specified tazget range, as can
be seen from figure 5. The credibility measure then falls sharply during the second
half of 1977, when money growth was well below the announced tazget range, but
then stabilizes again at a lower level during 1978 and early 1979. The election of the
Conservatíve Government under Thatcher in May 1979, the implementation of
monetazy targets as the prime policy objective in June 1979 and the adoption of the
biTFS in Mazch 1980 had little impact on the credibility measure. However, the
credibility measure falls drastically to almost zero after the abolition of the
`Supplementary Special Deposits' Scheme, commonly known as the `Corset', in June
1980. This system of direct credit controls, which constrained banks' liability
expansion, was, since its introduction in 1973, used by the Bank of England to
achieve its monetary targets. Its abolition caused massive transgressions of the
Sterling M3 target in 1980 and 1981.30 As a result, the credibility of Sterling M3
target announcements reaches its minimum in late 1981 and remains at an almost
constant low level thereafter. This time profile is consistent with the official
downgrading of the Sterling M3 target, which started with the March 1982 Budget,
when the massive overshooting of the Sterling M3 tazget ranges was officially
sanctioned by revising upwards the future tazgets and adopting a multiplicity of
targets. The downgrading of the Sterling M3 target growth announcements finally
came to an end with the Mazch 1987 Budget, when the Bank of England abolished
Sterling M3 and switched to announcing target ranges for MO as the main monetary
aggregate.
On the whole, the time path of the marginal credibility measure for Sterling M3
3oSee Thygessen (1984), p. 276, Minford (1988), p. 42, Goodhart (1989), p. 303 aud also
figure 6 of this paper.- 39 -
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announcemeuts presented above supports the view of Fischer (1988), that "the Bank
of England lacked credibility",31 and of Minford (1988) that "the MTFS not only jailed
to command credibility, fully or even to a signiftcant extent, it also failed to 6e carried
out in its ovm literal terms."32
Japan
In eazly 1975 the Bank of Japan abandoned most of its discretionary, activist
policies adopted after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange
rates and the first oil price shock in 1973 and moved to a new policy stance with
monetary targeting. Broad money, M2(fCDs)~, was chosen as the most important
intermediate tazget for monetazy policy and the achievement of price stability was
adopted as the first policy priority.34 In the actual management of the money supply,
the Bank of Japan's main operating targets were the interbank interest rates (ca11
and bill rates), and monetazy control was implemented by maniputating the discount
rate, reserve ratios, and through open mazket operations, occasionally supplemented
by the use of `window guideance`, that is, direct controls of bank lending to the
private non-bank sector.
Even though the Bank of Japan has a monetazy target, which is set for the
period of a year, not the monetazy target itself but `forecasts` of the targeted
aggregate M2(-~CDs) are announced to the public. The publication of these money
growth projections, which ate announced quarterly in terms of the percentage increase
over the previous yeaz in the average money stock of the quazter concerned, began in
31Fischer (1988), p. 23.
32Minford (1988), p. 42.
~In May 1979 banks were permitted to issue negotiable certificates of depostita (CDs and
secondazy trading in these inatruments stazted in April 1982. The CD component in apan
is under quantitative restrictions and relatively small. The error of using growth rates of
M2 instead of growth rates of M2~-CD can therefore be expected to be only minor.
34See Suzuki (1985). For details of monetary tazgeting in Japan see also Shimamoto (1983),
and for compazitive studies see Dotsey (1986) or Wagner (1989).- 41 -
July 1978, as depicted in figure 8.~ During 1978 Japanese monetary policy was eased
as the yen appreciated relative to the U.S. dollaz. As inflationazy pressure re-emerged
in the wake of the depreciation of the yen and the marked increase in oil and other
international commodity prices during the first half of 1979, monetazy policy was
tightened. Money growth rates started faping after mid 1979 and declined drastically
during 1980, leading to a quicker disinflation with much less extra unemployment in
Japan relative to other OECD countries. Once inflation was under control, the Bank
of Japan eased its restrictive course in 1981 with severe cuts in the discount rate, a
reduction of compulsory reserve requirements and an easing of ~window guidance~
ceilings on bank lending. Money growth accelerated in 1981, but declined again
during 1982 and 1983, when monetazy policy was dominated by the authorities'
objective not to weaken the yen. Between early 1984 and late 1986 M2(fCDs)
growth fluctuated around 8 percent and in 1987 accelerated again. During this more
recent period exchange rate as well as domestic demand considerations, in addition to
the concern over inflation, have progessively influenced the conduct of Japanese
monetary policy.
The average credibility measure for the Bank of Japan's M2(fCDs) projections
are displayed in figure 9 together with the corresponding credibility measure for the
Fed's M1 announcements. Japanese credibility is higher than US credibility in 1978
and declines slightly at the start of the announcement period. With the monetazy
contraction setting in after the second oil price shock in June 1979 the credibility of
M2(fCDs) announcements increases drastically and remains relatively high for the
rest of 1979. This result is consistent with the statement by Fisher (1988) that "the
Bank oj Japan clearly had achieved credibility by 1980".36 The relatively large
deviations of the projections from the actual growth rates during the sharp monetary
contraction of 1980, which are also reported in Meltzer (1986b), furthermore explain
asSuzuki (1985) explains that the use of projections rather than targets is giving the central
bank flexibility and freeing it from political preasure. See also Fischer (1988).
~Fischer (1988), p. 15.- 42 --43-
the decline in credibility of monetary announcements during that year and in early
1981. As monetary policy was eased azound mid 1981, the Bank of Japan again
achieved rates of growth close to its projections, thereby again enhancing credibility.
Until September 1985 this credibility was not undermined by the Bank of Japan's
increasing concern over the exchange rate since purchases and sales of foreign
exchange were not used to change the rate of money growth or to produce large
differences between projected and actual money growth rates.37 However, after
September~October 1985, when the Bank of Japan massively intervened in foreign
exchange markets, there is a first decline in the credibility of M2(fCDs)
announcements.38 Credibility then declines further during 1987, when monetary policy
was relaxed significantly as a result of renewed heavy exchange market interventions
and continuing financial market liberalization.
Switzerland
In 1975 the Swiss National Bank first announced a target for money growth. The
chosen aggregate was M1, currency in circulation plus sight depoaits held by
residents, although a target for equal growth in the monetazy base (MB) was
implied.39 Ir. this early phase of monetazy target announcements the adjusted monetary
base was chosen as an instrument for controlling the growth of M1. However, in
response to the sharp appreciation of the Swiss Franc against the dollar and the
German Mark in autumn 1978, the Swiss monetazy authority formally abandoned the
M1 growth target in favour of an explicit exchange rate target floor (of 0.8 Swiss
Francs per German Mark) and stated its intentions to intervene in the foreign
exchange markets as necessary. For 1979 no formal money growth target was
37On this point see also Meltzer (1986b), p. 670.
3sMeltzer [(1986b), (1987a)] also reports this policy switch to a system of lesa freely
fluctating exchange rates in Japan after the September 1985 Plaza agreement of the G5
countries.
390n this point see Johnson (1983), p. 749.-44-
announced, but after the situation in foreign exchange markets had mazkedly
improved in spring 1979, the Swiss National Bank returned to a policy stance of
actively targeting monetazy aggregates. This return of the Swiss National bank to a
policy of monetazy targeting was publicly announced in 1980. The new aggregate
chosen, however, was the monetary base, that is the sum of currency in circulation
plus deposita at the Swiss National Bank held by Swiss banks and by commercial
and industrial firms. In 1981 there was an additional minor change in the targeted
aggregate with the adoption of the adjusted monetazy base (MBA), which ia defined
as the monetary base adjusted for transitory fluctuations in banks' balance sheets.
Again the overriding policy objective for monetary policy was the preservation of
price stability. As depicted in figure 10 MBA growth targets were gradually lowered
over the following years from 4 percent in 1980-1981 to 3 percent in 1982-1985 and
finally to 2 percent in 1986-1987.
The estimate of the credibility of the Swiss National Bank's adjusted monetazy
base (MBA) growth announcementa is displayed in figure 11 relative to the
corresponding measure for the Fed's M1 announcements. In 1981 and during the first
half of 1982 the Swiss National Bank's credibility was relatively low while MBA
growth was negative and thus well below the 4 and 3 percent targgt. MBA growth
then accelerated during the rest of 1982 and credibility increases. After eazly 1983
MBA growth fluctuates around the 3 percent target and the variability of target
deviations ia progressively reduced during 1984 and 1985. As a result the credibility
of money growth announcementa is further increased and stabilizes considerably after
1984. With the reduction of the MBA growth target to 2 percent in 1986 and 1987
credibility again increases in two minor steps in these two years and is relatively
high at the end of the sample period.- 45 -
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Germany
Since December 1974 the Bundesbank once a yeaz announced an annual growth
target for the adjusted central bank money stock (CBM), an aggregate consisting of
currency in circulation40 and required reserves on domestic bank deposits at constant
reserve ratios.41 Following Trehan (1988), the German experience with CBM targeting
will be discussed here for three sub-periods, the pre-EMS phase 1975-1978, the early
EMS period 1979-1985 and the late phase 1986-1987.
Central bank money growth overshoot the fixed 8 percent tazget from 1975 to
1978, with increasing overshooting towazds the end of this period. The overshooting
in 1978, when cash held by banka was first recognized as pazt of required reserves, is
admitted by the Bundesbank to have been the yeaz with the largest target misses.
The Bundesbank attributed these target misses to both imperfect control and as well
as a deliberate reaction on external developments, mainly interventions to damp the
appreciation of the D-Mark.42 Furthermore, monetazy targeting at that time was still
considered to be at an experimental stage, and the conatant fïx-point tazget was only
regazded as being of limited practical relevance. After the 1975-1978 experience with
a constant fix-point tazget for CMB growth the Bundesbank adopted tazget range943
for 1979-1987 in order to allow some flexibility to address unexpected economic
developments, such as exchange rate movements. Furthermore, the upper bound of
the tazget range was lowered during 1979-1985 from 9 to 5 percent as part of the
40Before March 1978 currency held by banks was included in the currency position and
afterwards was accepted as part of required reserves. Thus, in March 1978 CMB under the
new reserve requirement was equal to 131.8 Mrd. German Mark, while CMB under the old
reserve requirement would have been 136.2 Mrd German Mazk. This structural break in
the reported series was accounted for here by pre-multiplying all data prior to Mazch 1978
by a factor 131.8~136.2 in order to derive more consistent growth rates for CMB.
41The constant reserve ratios are those effective in January 1974.
42See Deutsche Bundesbank ( 1985), p. 25 or Schlesinger (1983), p. 9, who states that "in
1977-1978 it (the Bundesbanjc) accepted substantial ~overshooting~ of monetazy growth in
order to counteract excessive 'real~ appreciation of the D-Mazk".
43From 1979-1983 a 3 percent range, from 1984-1986 a 2 percent range and for 1987 again
a 3 percent range was adopted.-47-
Bundesbank's anti-inflation policy stance. In addition, to clearly indicate its policy
intentions while adopting target ranges, the Bundesbank between 1979 and 1983 in
midyear announced where within the target range it would aim monetary growth.44
With the onset of the EMS and the second oil price shock in 1979 the Bundesbank
tightened monetary policy and CMB growth came down to within the target range in
the second half of 1979, and fluctuated azound the lower bound of the target range
in 1980 and 1981. CBM growth then moved from the lower to the upper bound of
the range in 1982, stayed at the upper bound during 1983 and lay at the core of the
target range during 1984 and 1985. After 1985 monetary policy was driven largely by
developments in foreign exchange marketa. As the mazk appreciated against the
dollar, monetary growth exceeded the upper bound of the target range in 1986 and
1987, despite the fact that the Bundesbank increased the upper bound of the target
range by half a percentage point each year. CMB targeting fïnally terminated in
January 1988, when the Bundesbank announced a 3~ percent range for the monetary
aggregate M3.
Figure 13 presents two measures of the marginal credibility of German CBM
growth announcements. The dashed and dotted line represents the marginal credibility
of the original CMB growth series and the solid and dotted line the break-adjusted
CMB growth series, which is focused upon in this paper. Note that both credibility
measures aze identical up to February 1978. With the recognition of cash held by
banks as part of required reserves, the credibility measure for non-adjusted CBM
more than doubles in March 1978, due to the low and on-target growth rates of
non-adjusted CBM. The credibility measure of adjusted CBM, however, declines as a
result of the large target overshooting of adjusted CBM during 1978. Thus, the
estimate of credibility for adjusted CMB supports the viewa of Hellwig 8e Neumann
(1987) that the Bundesbank's "delióerate overshooting of the official monetary target
44In 1979 and 1980 the Bundesbank aimed at the lower bound of the 6-9Q1o .and 5,Sqo
target ranges. In 1981 the lower half and in 1982 and 1983 the upper half of the 7-9 elo
tazget ranges were announced as revised targets during the year.- 48 --49-
in 1978 had contributed to rekindling in~ation and to lessening its credibility."~ The
relative success of the Bundesbank with more flexible monetary targeting between
1979 and 1985, which is also indicated by the average credibility (AC) measure
above, is not fully reflected by the marginal credibility (MC) estimate, which
increases only slightly but steadily between 1979 and early 1986. With monetary
policy being dominated by developments in foreign exchange mazkets after 1985 the
credibility of CBM announcements declines again at the end of the sample period.
This latter decline of the credibility of CBM target announcements in 1986 and 1987
is due to the massive tazget overshooting in these years and finally resulted in the
abolition of CBM target announcements in 1988.
The surprisingly low estimate of the marginal credibility of the Bundesbank's
CBM target announcements reported above requires some further comments. Firstly,
note that the relatively low credibility of CMB target announcements found in the
present paper is consistent with Trehan's (1988) finding that the Bundesbank's
wncern over inflation has not bound it to strict adherence to monetary targets, since
targets have been missed frequently and that the Bundesbank has retained a
considerable level of discretion in the implementation of monetary targeting.
Furthermore, the credibility of monetary target announcements discussed here has to
be distinguished from the credibility of the Bundesbank's antiinflation policy atance.
The credibility of this anti-inflation commitment is indisputable and empirical
evidence provided in Weber (1988c) shows that the Bundesbank's reputation as an
inflation fighter is highest amongst the major OECD countries. Two possible
explanations for the low credibility estimate found here aze found in the literature:
Fischer (1988) suggests that the lack of credibility could perhaps be due to the fact
that the Bundesbank had tolerated too high inflation in the late seventies. This
argument is supported by the above marginal credibility estimate for unadjusted
CBM, which for lower and on-target CMB growth in 1978 results in much higher
4sHellwig 8c Neumann (1987), p. 112.-50-
credibility. Secondly, the fact that all periods of major target miases and credibility
losses aze connected to undesired exchange rate developments (1978, 1986-1987) is
consistent with the view of Gleske (1987), who fears that at the moment in Germany
exchange rate considerations are given too much weight in the formulation and
implementation of monetary policy.4s
Franoe
With the election of Raymond Barre as prime minister in Mazch 1976 and the
adoption of the so~alled `Barre Plan', an orthodox deflationary stabilisation policy
package, in September 1976 the Banque de France began setting formal monetary
tazgets. In December 1976 this target, a single growth rate for M2 without tazget
bands was first publicly announced and between 1977 and 1981 the target took the
form of a single annually declining figure, as depicted in figure 14. Under the Bazre
Plan monetary policy wa9 more stringent than before and among the three
intermediate objectives of French monetary policy, that is money stock growth,
exchange rates and interest rates, the money atock target was of primary importance.
The achievement of monetary tazgets was implemented mainly by regulations in the
form of aelective credit controls and credit ceilings. In Mazch 1979 the onset of the
EMS compelled the Banque de France to keep the exchange rate of the Franc in a
given pazity band with other EMS member currencies. With the election of President
Mitterand in May 1981 economic policies were geared towazds a reduction of
unemployment by expansionazy fiscal policies.47 Monetary policy was relaxed in June
1981 by an unofficial upward revision of the M2 growth tazget (set by the previous
government), by easing credit ceilings and by putting strong official downwards
pressure on interest rates, while at the same time introducing foreign exchange
4sSee Gleske (1987), pp. 28-29.
47Public expenditure and the budget deficit were increased, consumption was stimulated
through increased social security benefits and the raising of the minimum wage (SMIG~ and
investment was encouraged by lazger interest rate subsidies (bonifacation).- 51 -
controls. R.eflation, the October 1981 devaluation of the Franc and speculative
pressure on the Franc in early 1982 then led to a tightening of policy, with the
reduction of inflation being restored as the main policy objective after the second
Franc devaluation in June 1982. In addition, prices and wages were frozen from June
until the end of October 1982 and the freeze was gradually phased out during 1983.
After the third devaluation of the Franc in March 1983 there was a turnaround in
French macro policy with the austerity program introduced under Prime Minister
Mouroy shortly afterwards. Fiscal and monetary policy were severely tightened and
even stricter foreign exchange controls were adopted. The monetary contraction of
1983 a.nd 1984 was mainly achieved by keeping interest rates so high that credit
ceilings were not binding. During the calendar years 1985 and 1986 the credit ceiling
system was then replaced by a system of progressive reserve requirements. By
January 1987 capital controls were finally removed and reserve requirements are now
proportional to bank deposits.
In figure 15 the estimate of the marginal credibility measure of French M2
target growth announcements is relatively high in the early Barre period, when M2
growth rates fluctuated around the announced rates in 1977 and 1978. This indicates
the initial success of the Banque de France, whose "main reason for announcing
publicly a monetary growth target was ... to strengthen the credibility of their
anti-inflation policy".48 Marginal credibility then falls drastically during 1979, when the
M2 target of 11 percent was vastly overshot49 as a result of an accommodative
monetary policy at the time of the second oil price shock of late 1978~ early 1979,
which caused a rise in world inflation, interest rates (as a result of inflationary
expectations) and money demand (due to higher short-term than long-term interest
rates). The credibility of monetary announcements then stabilizes again at a lower
level between 1980 and 1984 and shows no major credibility effecta of the early
reflationary Mitterand period (1981-1982) or the 1983 adoption of the deflationary
4sOECD (1979).
49Average actual M2 growth was 14.4 percent p.a. in 1979, see Raymond (1989), p. 113.- 52 -
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austerity period. The credibility of monetary announcements however declines again
with the massive target misses in 1984 and 1985,~ when the Banque de France
adopted a program of financial mazket liberalization and implemented new monetazy
control procedures based on open market operations rather than direct credit control
through quantitative restrictions. At the same time, French monetary policy was
primarily directed towards the exchange rate51 instead of the rate of money growth as
intermediate target in order to achieve the central bank's ultimate tazget, the
reduction of the inflation rate. The decline in the credibility of monetary tazget
announcements found here is therefore consistent with this downgrading of M2 target
announcements and the increasing commitment towazds the EMS in the conduct of
French monetary policy.52
Italy
In 1974 the Banca d'Italia decided to set a monetary objective in terms of a
'total domestic credit' (TDC) ceiling as an intermediate target, after having targeted
the monetary base before. This decision to target credit aggregates was supplemented
by recourse to a progressively more sophisticated system of direct credit controls. By
the end of 1976 bank credit ceilings were reintroduced as pazt of a stabilization
package adopted after the exchange rate crisis of 1976. After the onset of the EMS
in March 1979 and the second oil price shock 1979 monetazy policy turned more
restrictive towazds the end of 1979 and remained restrictive throughout 1980. A
SoAn additional problem here is that the 1984 and 1985 money growth targets were
expressed for M2R, that pazt of M2 held by residents, while for 1986 only a rowth tazget
for M3 was issued by the Banque de France. This discontinuety in the definition of the
relevant monetary aggregate suggests a downgrading of the importance of monetary
targeting by the Banque de France and the adoption of a'softer~ approach to monetary
targeting. Note that at this stage of the paper these 1984-1986 tazget announcements aze
simply treated as equivalent to M2 tazgeta, while for a more adequate treatment aome form
of adjustment would be desirable.
51See Wyplosz (1988b), p. 62 for this interpretation of French post 1983 monetary policy.
52Empirical evidence on an increasing credibility of the French exchange rate commítment
towards the EMS is provided in Weber (1989).- 54 -
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system of compulsory reserves on deposits and a limit on the increase of financing in
foreign exchange for imports were introduced. In July 1981 the Banca d'Italia was
freed from the obligation to purchase all the unsold public debt of the Treasury.
Until the abolition of ceilings on loana in mid 1983 the Banca d'Italia continued to
frame its monetary policy mainly in the form of credit tazgeting and interest rate
objectives, while at the same time a policy of strictly tazgeting some monetazy
aggregate was publicly rejected by the Italian central bank. However, explicit
monetary targets were adopted from 1984 onwazds, when the Banca d'Italia started
announcing growth targets for M2. Furthermore, the conduct of monetary policy was
shifted towards an open market operation modus as the normal monetary policy
instrument.
The estimate of the marginal credibility of the Italian total domestic credit
expansion target in figure 17 increases continuously after 1978 and shows only minor
declines in times of massive tazget deviations, such as the overshooting of 1984 and
1987 and the undershooting of 1978, 1982 and 1985, as depicted in figure 16.53 During
the EMS phase there is a strong similazity between the time paths of the German
and Italian credibility measures. Note, however, that Italian credit ceiling targets are
qualitatively different from monetary targets, since the Banca d'Italia exercises direct
control over total domestic credit. This is supported by the finding that a similar
regression for M2 growth over the period 1984 to 1987 resulted in a marginal
credibility estimate for Italian M2 tazget announcements of MC-0.0262, which is
considerably lower than the corresponding estimate of MC-0.097 for Italian TDC
announcements in the last column of table 4. This result is also consistent with the
53Note that these credit ceiling tazgets are qualitatively different from the monetary
targets (or target ranges) analysed above since any rate of growth below the ceiling is to be
identified as the achievement of the target. Therefore, monetazy authorities will only aim
at pushing the actual growth rate towards the target if it is overshot, which implies an
asymmetrical objective function as opposed to the symmetrical type used in equation (5).
Furthermore, least-squares inference is unable to extract such non-symmetric information
from these type of targets and different estimation methods would be necessary for a more
adequate treatment.-56-
fact that for credit ceilings as opposed to monetary tazgets any rate of growth below
the ceiling is identified as the achievement of the tazget and hence as a credible
policy since the central bank will only aim at pushing the actual growth rate towards
the target if it ia overshot.
5. Summary and Conclusions
The evidence on the credibility of monetary tazget announcementa presented
above suggests that, with the exception of Switzerland, a downgrading of monetary
tazgeting is experienced in all major industrialized countries in the late 1980s relative
to the 1970s and early 1980s. Indications of 'soft~ monetary targeting are manifold.
The most rigorous changes in the conduct of monetary policy were made in the
Netherlands, Canada and Australia, where monetazy targets were abolished altogether.
In Australia a variety of additional policy indicators was used to determine the
course of monetazy policy whilat in Canada and the Netherlands exchange rate
targets were adopted. Evidence on an increasing importance of exchange rate
considerations in the conduct of monetary policy is however not limited to these
countries. Within the EMS system of managed exchange rates also France, Italy and
Germany aze compelled to keep their bilateral exchange rates in the given parity
bands. Furthermore, exchange rate considerations relative to the U.S. Dollar had a
strong impact on monetary policy in both Japan and Germany recently, while explicit
exchange rate targets relative to the D-mark caused the temporary abolition of
monetary targeting in Switzerland in the late 1970s. Finally, implicit exchange rate
tazgets relative to the D-mark supplemented monetary targeting in the United
Kingdom during 1987 and 1988. In all cases the commitment of the central bank to
monetazy targeting is undermined by their increasing commitment towards the
exchange rate, which in turn resulted in a decline of the credibility of monetary
target announcements. One possible explanation for the accentuation of ~soft'
monetazy targeting, which is now prevailing in most countries is given in Boissieu-57-
(1988), who states that "central banks prejer to keep some ftxed points, even iJ they
overshoot announced targets. The loss oJ credibility and reputation would be greater in
the case oj abolition than it is with overshooting."S4
Evidence of policy switches to 'soft` monetary targeting are alao given
independent of exchange rate considerations. In the United States and the United
Kingdom a`soft` approach to monetazy targeting was adopted by announcing targeta
for a variety of monetazy aggregates. Failures in achieving the tazget for one
monetary aggregate were easily excused if targets for other monetazy aggregates were
achieved and `Goodhard's law`, a modification of the `Lucas critique' according to
which the attempt to control any monetazy aggregate will destabilise the demand for
it, was frequently referred to in this context.
An argument in favour of 'soft' monetary targeting, that is the continuing of
monetary targeting despite frequent target misses, is that even if monetary tazgets
are not perfectly credible, they nevertheless provide the public with useful information
about the future course of monetary policy. The impact of this information on
expectations is found to be positive in the present paper. The two central banks
most successful in this respect are the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Japan.
Note that both central banks subscribe to completely different philosophies of
monetary targeting: whilst the Bank of Japan in principle follows an annual monetary
tazget, it nevertheless provides the public with a quarterly signal of its short-run
money growth intentions. The Swiss National Bank on the contrary understands its
monetazy announcement signal more as a medium-term (two-year) signal which
effectively constrains future money growth decisions. In both cases the announcement
signal is relatively credible and the information content of both forms of target
announcements is found to be relatively high.
s4Boissieu (1988), p. 66.-58-
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